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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS article surveys significant developments in intellectual prop-
erty (IP) law during the past year.' While we focus on precedential
case law in the Fifth Circuit, we also review IP law developments
that are likely to be influential in the evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence.
Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. "For
developments in trademark and copyright law, the Fifth Circuit's author-
ity is binding," 2 but other circuits, such as the Second and the Ninth, are
considered highly persuasive.3 "Because all cases concerning a substan-
tive patent law-issue are appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,"4 decisions from that court during the Survey period are
included in this article.
The U.S. Supreme Court was quite active in the intellectual property
field since the last Survey period ended, deciding seven cases involving IP
issues5 and granting certiorari on four others.6 In patents, the Court
showed particular interest in what qualifies as patentable subject matter.7
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. David L. McCombs & Phillip B. Philbin, Intellectual Property Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 1409, 1410 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Andrew Cook, Do As We Say, Not As We Do: A Study of the Well-
Known Marks Doctrine in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412,
417-18 (2009) (discussing the split of authority on the well-known Mark's doctrine of
trademark law); Christopher R. Perry, Exporting American Copyright Law, 37 GONz. L.
REV. 451, 467 (2001) (explaining the Fifth Circuit's consideration of a split of authority
between the Second and Ninth Circuits to "carve out a compromise position" in copyright
law).
4. McCombs & Philbin, supra note 2; see 28 U.S. § 1295(a) (2012).
5. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct.
1690 (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Golan v. Holder, 132
S. Ct. 873 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011).
6. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 694
(2012) (mem.); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 420, 420 (2012) (mem.); Bowman v. Monsanto
Co., 133 S. Ct. 420, 420 (2012) (mem.); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1905, 1905 (2012) (mem.).
7. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and affd in part,




The Court considered whether certain medical diagnostic methods are
patentable,8 and it is prepared to decide whether isolated human genes
may receive patent protection. 9 Other issues considered by the Court in-
clude the level of knowledge required for induced infringement,10 the
standard applicable to a district court's review of proceedings at the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 1 and the standard of proof re-
quired to support an invalidity defense. 12 The Federal Circuit also made
important developments in its patent law jurisprudence, 13 but perhaps
more significant than any of these court decisions is the enactment of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which makes substantial changes to
the way patents are prosecuted, granted, and subsequently reviewed. 14
In copyright, the U.S. Supreme Court decided whether Congress may
grant copyright protection to works previously in the public domain,15
and it is set to decide whether copyright's first sale doctrine applies to
imported, foreign-made goods. 16 In trademark, the Court decided
whether a trademark registrant can foreclose an invalidity challenge by
promising not to sue the challenger.17 Finally, the Second Circuit issued
important copyright and trademark decisions relating to the safe harbor
provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 18 and
whether a single color may receive trademark protection in the fashion
industry. 19
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. A Grim Diagnosis for Diagnostic Patents-Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
Following its 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos,20 the Supreme Court in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. again took
up the question of what is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.21 Unlike Bilski, which produced a unanimous result but several
opinions, 22 the unanimous result in Mayo was announced in a single opin-
8. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
9. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324.
10. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2063.
11. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012).
12. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
13. See Peter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief
Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 405, 406-08 (2012).
14. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
15. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2012).
16. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
17. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2013).
18. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2012).
19. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
211-12 (2d Cir. 2012).
20. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
21. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
22. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
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ion by Justice Breyer. 23 In a highly-anticipated decision that was cele-
brated by the medical community but sharply criticized by the
biotechnology industry,24 the Court held that the diagnostic patents at
issue were unpatentable under § 101.25
Prometheus Laboratories was the exclusive licensee of patents cover-
ing processes that help doctors determine the appropriate dosage level of
thiopurine drugs to be administered to patients with autoimmune dis-
eases. 2 6 The claims at issue involved: (1) administering a thiopurine drug
to a patient; and (2) determining the level of certain metabolites in the
patient, wherein specified levels of metabolites would indicate a need to
increase or decrease the dosage of the drug. 27 The Federal Circuit held
these patents valid, reasoning that these steps involved the transforma-
tion of the human body and thus satisfied the "machine or transformation
test" of patentability.28 The Supreme Court vacated that decision and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of its Bilski decision, which rejected
the "machine or transformation test" as the sole test for patent eligibil-
ity.2 9 On remand, the Federal Circuit again concluded that the claims
were patent eligible.30
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and re-
jected the contested claims as covering unpatentable laws of nature-
namely, relationships between levels of certain metabolites in the blood
and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug would be too high
or too low.3 ' The Court grappled with the question of whether the claims
added enough to this correlation to distinguish a patent-eligible applica-
tion of a law of nature from the mere law itself, and it concluded that they
did not. 3 2 The Court reasoned that the additional steps of administering a
drug, determining the level of metabolites, and using set levels of metabo-
lites to adjust the dosage were "well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies] already engaged in by the scientific community" and added
nothing significant to the law of nature.33 The Court was concerned with
the possibility of inhibiting further discovery by improperly tying up fu-
ture use of laws of nature with patents that, in effect, "apply the natural
law." 34 The opinion observed that the claims, by telling a doctor to mea-
23. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
24. Brent Kendall et al., Top Court Decision Stirs Alarm In Biotech, WALL ST. J., Mar.
21, 2012, at Al.
25. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1295.
28. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345-46,
1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (mem.).
29. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543, 3543 (2010)
(mem.); see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
30. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
31. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-99
(2012).
32. Id. at 1297.
33. Id. at 1298.
34. Id. at 1301.
978 [Vol. 66
Intellectual Property Law
sure metabolite levels and consider those measurements in light of the
described statistical relationships, "tie up the doctor's subsequent treat-
ment decision," even if that decision is not changed by the inference the
doctor has drawn using the correlations.35
The Court's opinion is not a model of clarity. After concluding that the
relationship between metabolite levels and appropriate dosage of thi-
opurine drugs is an unpatentable law of nature, the Court rejected these
claims because they did not add "enough" to the natural law-the addi-
tional steps were "well-understood, routine, conventional activity." 36
However, the opinion provides scant guidance for lower courts in deter-
mining what constitutes such conventional activity and explicitly states
that although this § 101 analysis may sometimes overlap with a § 102 nov-
elty analysis, the § 101 inquiry remains separate and distinct.37 Despite
the opinion's lack of analytical guidance, its tenor sends a clear message
to lower courts that § 101 continues to demand some "inventive concept"
above and beyond any law of nature that the patent uses.38 Determining
exactly what that "inventive concept" is, or what qualifies as a law of
nature, is left for future decisions.
2. A Fresh Look in District Court-Kappos v. Hyatt
Under 35 U.S.C. § 145, a patent applicant whose application has been
denied by both a PTO examiner and the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (BPAI) may seek judicial review by filing a civil action
against the Director of the PTO in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.39 In Kappos v. Hyatt, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether there are any limitations on the applicant's ability to in-
troduce new evidence before the district court, and what standard of
review that court should apply when considering such new evidence.40
Gilbert Hyatt filed a patent application with 117 claims, all of which
were rejected by the PTO examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of an
adequate written description. 41 On appeal, the BPAI approved thirty-
eight claims but denied the rest.42 "Hyatt then filed a § 145 action in Fed-
35. Id. at 1302.
36. Id. at 1297-98. The Court left open the question of whether less conventional steps
would have saved the patents at issue. Id. at 1302.
37. Id. at 1304.
38. Id. at 1294.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), was signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011.
"[T]he Act changed the venue for § 145 actions from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia [and also] changed the name of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences to
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. . .. " Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 n.1 (2012)
(internal citations omitted). The changes made by the Act did not apply to this case, and all
references in the opinion and in this discussion are to the law as it existed prior to the Act.
See id.
40. Id. at 1694.




eral District Court against the Director of the PTO . . . ."43 At that pro-
ceeding, Hyatt submitted a written declaration that identified portions of
the patent specification that he believed supported the previously re-
jected claims.44 Hyatt had not presented that declaration to the examiner
or the BPAI, and the district court refused to consider it absent a good
reason why it had not been previously presented. 4 5 Without the new evi-
dence, the record before the district court was the same as the record
before the PTO, so the court reviewed the PTO's factual findings under
the "substantial evidence" standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 4 6 The Federal Circuit convened en banc and reversed, holding that
an applicant may introduce new evidence in a § 145 proceeding even
without justification for failing to present it to the PTO and that when
new evidence is presented, the district court must make de novo findings
to take that evidence into account. 47
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit and held that there
are no limitations to an applicant's ability to present new evidence to the
district court in a § 145 proceeding, apart from those found in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 8 The Court
also held that where new evidence is presented to the district court on a
disputed fact question, the court should review all of the evidence de
novo and apply no deference to the PTO's factual findings.4 9 The Court
reasoned that since the PTO could not account for evidence that it had
never seen, its findings of fact should receive no deference.50 Although
this review should be de novo, the Court added that a district court could
use its "broad discretion" to determine the weight to be given to new
evidence presented at a § 145 proceeding.51
3. Warning to the Willfully Blind-Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A.
In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the Supreme Court con-
sidered "whether a party who 'actively induces infringement of a patent'
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute pat-
ent infringement." 5 2 The Court began by observing that the language of
§ 271(b) is ambiguous and lends itself easily to two readings.53 The stat-
ute could mean that one is liable under § 271(b) for simply inducing con-





47. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
48. Kappos, 132 S. Ct. at 1700-01.
49. Id. at 1696, 1701.
50. Id. at 1696.
51. Id. at 1700.
52. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011).
53. Id. at 2065; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) ("Whoever actively induces infringement
of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
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inducer to know that the induced conduct infringes a patent. 5 4
The Court, relying on its related holding in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., held that induced infringement under
§ 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent in-
fringement.55 The Court analogized this requirement to criminal law and
held that "willful blindness" is sufficient to establish the knowledge re-
quirement of § 271(b). 56 A willfully blind defendant "must subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and .. . must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact."57 As Justice Kennedy
notes in dissent, "[t]he Court appears to endorse the willful blindness ...
[standard] for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge"-a sweep-
ing holding to make in the context of a civil patent action.58
4. The Standard Remains the Same-Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
Partnership
Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, "[a] patent shall be presumed valid," and "[t]he
burden of establishing invalidity . . . rest[s] on the party asserting such
invalidity." 59 For nearly the last three decades, the Federal Circuit's inter-
pretation of § 282 has required a party asserting a patent's invalidity to
prove it by "clear and convincing evidence." 60 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Ltd. Partnership, the Supreme Court confirmed that § 282 requires an
invalidity defense to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 61
Defendant Microsoft claimed at trial that i4i's prior sale of a certain
software program rendered i4i's patent invalid under the on-sale bar of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). 6 2 Importantly, this software was never presented to the
PTO examiner. 63 Microsoft argued that since the PTO never actually
looked at this evidence, the presumption of the patent's validity was
weakened, and that in these circumstances, invalidity could be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence. 64
The Court rejected Microsoft's argument and kept the clear and con-
vincing standard in place.65 The Court found nothing in its precedents or
§ 282 that would support such a "fluctuating standard of proof." 66 As to
evidence that was never presented to the PTO examiner, the Court held
54. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065.
55. Id. at 2065-68 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 488 (1964) (interpreting contributory infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) to
require that the contributory infringer know he is contributing to patent infringement)).
56. Id. at 2068-69.
57. Id. at 2070.
58. See id. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
60. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243-44 (2011) (citing Am.
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
61. Id. at 2242.
62. Id. at 2243-44.
63. Id. at 2244.
64. Id. at 2249.
65. Id. at 2242, 2249-51.
66. Id. at 2250.
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that the best way to account for the potentially-weakened presumption of
validity in these cases would be to instruct the jury to consider the fact
that the PTO never considered the evidence. 67 Courts should typically
give this instruction if a party requests it.68
This holding makes no significant change to the standard of proof ap-
plied to an invalidity defense. A party asserting this defense must always
present clear and convincing evidence to support its position.69 However,
the opinion reminds practitioners in cases involving prior art that was not
considered by the PTO to request that the jury be instructed to consider
that fact when making its invalidity determination. 70
5. Certiorari Granted-Monsanto Co. v. Bowman
The "doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized
sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights [in] that item."71 In
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, the Federal Circuit considered the question of
whether patent exhaustion applies to self-replicating technologies, such as
seeds.72
Vernon Hugh Bowman, a grower, purchased patented soybean seeds
from one of Monsanto's licensed seed producers.73 The sale was subject
to a limited use license, which provided that a licensed grower may not
sell or save the progeny of the patented seeds for planting or replanting. 74
However, "Monsanto authorize[d] growers to sell second-generation
seed[s] to local grain elevators as a commodity, without requiring growers
to place restrictions on grain elevators' subsequent sales of that seed."75
When Bowman began purchasing commodity seed from a local grain ele-
vator for planting a late-season crop, he noticed that most of the com-
modity seed possessed the same chemical-resistant properties as the more
expensive patented seed he had purchased for his first crop.76 The prog-
eny of this planted commodity seed also possessed the patented chemical-
resistant properties.77 Monsanto sued for patent infringement, alleging
that "Bowman's use of the commodity seeds was not within the scope of
the [limited use license]," which covered only those seeds purchased from
Monsanto or a licensed dealer.78




71. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
72. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1346-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 420 (2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). The Federal Circuit decided a similar
issue in two previous cases, both of which involved the same Monsanto-patented soybean
seeds. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
73. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1345-46.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1346.
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The Federal Circuit agreed with Monsanto and found that Bowman's
planting of the commodity seeds infringed upon Monsanto's patents.79
The court held that even if Monsanto's patent rights in the seeds were
exhausted by the authorized sale to grain elevators, an authorized sale
conveys only the right to use the article, not the right to make a new
infringing article.80 Once a grower plants commodity seeds containing the
patented technology, those seeds will grow into plants that produce a
new, infringing generation of patented seeds.81 To hold that this new gen-
eration does not infringe "would eviscerate the rights" of the owners of
patents to self-replicating technologies. 82
In October 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the Federal Circuit erred by: (1) refusing to find patent exhaus-
tion in patented seeds even after an authorized sale; and (2) creating an
exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating tech-
nologies.83 If the Court reverses the Federal Circuit, it will cause a mas-
sive upheaval in the business models of agricultural biotechnology
companies. 84
6. Certiorari Granted-Association for Molecular Pathology v. United
States Patent and Trademark Office
For nearly thirty years, the PTO has granted patents relating to human
genes.85 The Federal Circuit affirmed this practice in Association for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, reversing
a lower court's finding that a human gene is unpatentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.86 The Supreme Court vacated that decision and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light
of its decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.87
The patents at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology relate to
isolated and synthetic human genes and associated mutations that are
connected" with a predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers" (the
BRCA genes).88 Myriad Genetics, Inc. is the exclusive licensee of these
79. Id. at 1348.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
83. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420, 420 (2012) (mem.).
84. In May 2013, the Court affirmed and applied essentially the same reasoning as the
Federal Circuit. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
85. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
86. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgm't vacated sub nom. Ass'n Molecular Pathology v. Myr-
iad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (mem.).
87. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 132 S. Ct. at 1794; see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
88. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309.
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patents, which cover not only the BRCA genes themselves, but also
methods of "'[c]omparing' a patient's BRCA [nucleotide] sequence with
the normal . . . sequence to identify the presence of [any] cancer-predis-
posing mutations."8 9
Following remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit
reached the same conclusion as it had before and held that human genes
in the form of isolated DNA are "patent-eligible subject matter under
§ 101."90 Although the court briefly considered Mayo in its analysis, it
found that Mayo did not control the question of whether these composi-
tions of matter are patent-eligible because Mayo concerned only method
claims.91 The court instead relied on Supreme Court precedent indicating
that man-made compositions of matter with "markedly different charac-
teristics" from those found in nature are patent-eligible. 92 The court de-
termined that isolated DNA possesses markedly different characteristics
from naturally occurring DNA. 93 "Natural DNA exists in the body as one
of forty-six large, contiguous DNA molecules" each of which is "inter-
twined with various proteins" to make up a chromosome. 94 "Isolated
DNA, in contrast, is a free-standing portion of a . .. natural DNA mole-
cule" that has had its covalent bonds severed through human interven-
tion, giving it a distinctive chemical identity. 95 The court also noted the
adverse effects on the inventing and investing communities that would
result from disrupting the PTO's longstanding practice of issuing patents
on DNA molecules, and it determined that Congress is in a better posi-
tion to make such a drastic change. 96
Although the court upheld the validity of the patents on the BRCA
genes themselves, it reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that the method pat-
ents related to those genes are unpatentable under § 101.97 These patents
claim steps of "comparing" or "analyzing" two nucleotide sequences to
determine whether a mutation exists.98 The court held these claims to be
unpatentable "abstract mental processes," indistinguishable from those
found invalid in Mayo.99
In November 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the
sole issue of whether human genes are patentable. 10 If Mayo's reasoning
applies to composition of matter claims as well as to method claims, the
Court will likely focus on whether isolating these naturally occurring
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1333.
91. Id. at 1325.
92. Id. at 1326-28 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 310 (1980)).
93. Id. at 1328.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1333.
97. Id. at 1334-35.
98. Id. at 1309, 1334.
99. Id. at 1334.




genes adds "enough" or supplies an "inventive concept" so as to render
them patent-eligible.10 1 As Judge Bryson noted in his dissent from the
Federal Circuit decision, the process of isolating a compound is rather
routine, much like the "well-understood, routine, conventional"
processes in Mayo that failed the eligibility determination. 10 2 If the Su-
preme Court decides that human genes are not patentable, the decision
would deal a major blow to the biotechnology industry.103
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Mental Gymnastics in the Pursuit of Justice-Akamai Technologies,
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.
Ever since the Federal Circuit's ruling in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Pay-
mentech, L.P.,104 owners of method patents have had difficulty enforcing
those patents in situations where performance of the claimed method
steps is spread among more than one actor.105 The BMC court applied
the "single-entity rule," which provides that a defendant is liable for di-
rect infringement of a method patent only if the defendant, or one under
his direction or control, performs all of the claimed steps.106 The BMC
court added that for a party to be liable for induced infringement, some
other single entity must be liable for direct infringement.107 Since liability
for direct infringement requires that one single entity perform all of the
claimed method steps, BMC established that liability for induced in-
fringement requires as a predicate that some single entity perform all of
the claimed steps.108
In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., the Federal
Circuit convened en banc to determine whether, and under what circum-
stances, a defendant may be held liable for inducing others to perform
some or all of the claimed steps of a method patent when no single party
performs all of the steps. 109 The en banc court reviewed together the
panel decisions in Akamai and McKesson Technologies v. Epic Systems
Corp., both of which relied on BMC and Muniauction to find no infringe-
ment liability when no single party performs all of the steps of a method
101. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294,
1297 (2012).
102. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
103. In June 2013, the Court found that "separating [a] gene from its surrounding ge-
netic material is not an act of invention" and invalidated patents to isolated genes. Ass'n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117, 2120 (2013).
104. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), over-
ruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc).
105. See, e.g., Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
106. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378-79, 1381.
107. Id. at 1379.
108. See id. at 1378-79.




Akamai Technologies, Inc., owned a patent related to a method for
efficient delivery of web content. The claimed method involved "placing
some of a content provider's content elements on a set of replicated serv-
ers and modifying the content provider's web page to instruct web brows-
ers to retrieve that content from those servers."111 The accused infringer,
Limelight Networks, Inc., offered a similar content distribution service,
but instead of directly modifying its content providers' web pages, it pro-
vided its content providers with instructions so that they could do it them-
selves.112 In the McKesson case, "McKesson Information Solutions LLC
own[ed] a patent covering a method of electronic communication be-
tween healthcare providers and their patients."113 The defendant, Epic
Systems Corp., provided software to healthcare providers that enabled
such electronic communication. 11 4 However, Epic did not perform any of
the claimed method steps for electronically communicating; performance
of those steps was split among the healthcare providers and their
patients."15
The en banc Federal Circuit held that the defendants in these cases
could be found liable for induced infringement.'1 6 The court arrived at
this conclusion by starting with two well-supported propositions." 7 The
first is that liability for direct infringement of a method claim requires
that the accused infringer "perform all the steps of the claimed method,
either personally or through another acting under his direction or con-
trol."118 The second is that liability for induced infringement requires
some direct infringement to occur. 119 The court concluded that, contrary
to the now-overruled holding in BMC, proving that direct infringement
occurred is not the same as proving that some entity would be liable for
direct infringement.12 0 The court found "no reason to immunize" from
liability one who knowingly induces others to commit infringing acts
"simply because the parties have structured their conduct so that no sin-
gle [party] has committed all the acts necessary to [incur] . . . liability for
direct infringement." 1 21 The court noted that the impact on the patentee
is the same whether one party or several parties together perform the
claimed steps. 122 One who "cause[s], urge[s], encourage[s], or aid[s]" in-
110. Id.; see McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011), rev'd and remanded, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Lime-
light Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).





116. Id. at 1318.
117. Id. at 1307-08.
118. Id. at 1307.
119. Id. at 1308.
120. Id. at 1308-09.




fringing conduct may be liable for induced infringement, even if no party
would be liable for direct infringement.12 3
The court's opinion provides owners of method patents with a viable
remedy for infringement, 124 but it leaves a host of doctrinal difficulties in
its wake. Because the court based its entire decision on the theory of
induced infringement, it never reached the issue of whether liability for
direct infringement may lie when more than one independent party is
responsible for performing all of the claimed steps of a method patent.125
As Judge Newman noted in dissent, this could leave parties who actually
perform the claimed steps without any liability for infringement.12 6 Ab-
sent infringement liability, these parties might not be "subject to damages
or injunction." 1 2 7 Furthermore, it remains to be seen how far liability will
be extended for "aiding" or "encouraging" infringing activity. For exam-
ple, in a case like McKesson, must the inducer directly encourage the
patients themselves to use the software, or is it sufficient to induce the
healthcare providers to operate the software, knowing that they will then
induce patients to perform the remaining steps? Resolving these kinds of
issues will be a challenge for lower courts in the years to come.
2. Let the Judge Decide That-Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.
Gore & Associates
Awarding enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 "requires a show-
ing of willful infringement."1 2 8 In the landmark opinion In re Seagate
Technology, LLC, the Federal Circuit set out a two-pronged test for es-
tablishing willful infringement.129 This test first requires the patentee to
"show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite
an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of
a valid patent .... If this threshold objective standard is [met,] the paten-
tee must [then] demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was
either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the ...
infringer."' 30 Whether the threshold "objective" prong is met depends in
part upon whether the defendant "relie[d] on a reasonable defense to a
charge of infringement."13 1 In Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.
Gore & Associates, the Federal Circuit considered whether Seagate's ob-
jective prong is a question of law to be decided by the judge and subject
123. See id. at 1308-09 (quoting Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d
1368, 1379 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 1306.
125. Id. at 1307.
126. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2012) (permitting the court to "increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed").
129. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
130. Id.
131. See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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to de novo review. 132
The court observed that although "[t]he ultimate [determination] of
willfulness has long been [considered] . . . a question of fact," whether to
label something a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question
of law and fact sometimes turns on which judicial actor is in the better
position to decide the question.133 The court held that a judge should
decide whether Seagate's objective prong is met because the ultimate de-
termination of whether an infringement defense is "reasonable" is a ques-
tion of law better suited to the court and reviewable de novo. 134 This
remains true even when the infringement defense depends on underlying
questions of fact that are decided by a jury.135 The court found this ap-
proach consistent with similar areas of law that involve mixed questions
of law and fact.136 Subjecting these kinds of questions to de novo review
also has the added benefit of "unify[ing] precedent."1 37 In deciding
whether Seagate's objective prong is met, a judge should determine
"whether a 'reasonable litigant could realistically expect"' its infringe-
ment defenses to succeed.138
3. You Didn't Build That Demand-Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp.
The Federal Circuit continued its recent trend of demanding ever more
reliable evidence to support a damages award for patent infringement. 1 3 9
The patent at issue in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. concerned a
software registration system to deter software piracy.140 Uniloc sought
damages for willful infringement based upon Microsoft's software regis-
tration system for its Word XP, Word 2003, and Windows XP pro-
grams.141 At trial, Uniloc's damages expert used the "25 percent rule of
thumb" to arrive at a starting point for his damages calculation. 142 The 25
percent rule "approximate[s] the reasonable royalty rate that [a] manu-
facturer of a patented product would be willing to offer a . . . patentee
during a hypothetical negotiation." 1 4 3 The rule suggests that a licensee of
patented technology would pay 25 percent of its expected profits for use
of the license and retain the other 75 percent for itself.144 Uniloc's expert
132. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
133. Id. at 1006.
134. Id. at 1006-07.
135. Id. at 1007.
136. Id. (discussing the standard of review applied to issues of "sham" litigation and
malicious prosecution, both of which involve "objectively baseless claims").
137. Id. at 1008 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98 (1996)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. (quoting iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
139. See generally Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
140. Id. at 1296.
141. Id. at 1295-97.
142. Id. at 1311.
143. Id. at 1312.
144. See id. at 1311.
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referenced a Microsoft document which valued a software activation key
at $10, and after multiplying by 25 percent, he arrived at a baseline roy-
alty rate of $2.50 per software package. 145 He then multiplied this rate by
the total number of software packages Microsoft sold to obtain a total
damages award of over $560 million.146 Conceding that this was a rather
large amount of money, the expert used another method to check the
reasonableness of his initial estimate.147 He multiplied Microsoft's total
number of software packages sold by the average sales price per package
of $85 (i.e., the entire market value of a package), yielding $19.28 billion
in gross revenue.148 The expert then compared his initial estimate to the
$19 billion figure and found that it represented a royalty rate of only 2.9
percent of gross revenues, well below what he found typical in the
software industry.149 The jury awarded $388 million in damages.150 Al-
though the district court accepted the use of the 25 percent rule, it
granted Microsoft a new trial on damages due to the improper use of the
"entire market value" rule, which put the $19 billion figure before the
jury.15
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a new trial on
damages, finding several problems with the methodology employed by
Uniloc's damages expert. 152 The court began by assessing the reliability
of the 25 percent rule as a means for calculating damages.153 The court
noted that although it had sometimes "passively tolerated" the rule's use,
the admissibility of evidence based on the rule had "never been squarely"
before the court.154 The court found the 25 percent rule to be a "funda-
mentally flawed tool," and it held as a matter of Federal Circuit law that
evidence relying on the rule is inadmissible under "the Federal Rules of
Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of
the case at issue."' 55 "To be admissible, expert testimony opining on a
reasonable royalty rate must 'carefully tie proof of damages to the
claimed invention's footprint in the market place."1 56 The court found
that the 25 percent rule did nothing to account for a particular hypotheti-
cal negotiation or reasonable royalty involving any particular technology,
industry, or party.'57 Testimony based on the rule is therefore "unrelia-






150. Id. at 1301.
151. Id. at 1301, 1312.
152. Id. at 1312.
153. Id. at 1312-19.
154. Id. at 1314.
155. Id. at 1315.
156. Id. at 1317 (quoting ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1318.
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The court also rejected Uniloc's use of the entire market value rule in
arriving at the $19 billion "check" on damages.159 "The entire market
value rule allows a patentee to assess damages based on the entire market
value of the accused product only where the patented feature creates the
'basis for customer demand." 160 Here, the evidence was undisputed that
the software activation key did not create the basis for customer demand
of the software itself.161 The court also rejected Uniloc's argument that
the entire market value may be used as long as the royalty rate is low
enough.162 Asserting a low royalty rate does nothing to show that the
patented feature drives demand for the accused product.163 The court fi-
nally noted "the danger[s] of admitting consideration of the entire market
value of the accused" product in situations such as this-"where the pat-
ented component does not create the basis for customer demand."164 Evi-
dence that a company has made $19 billion in revenue from an infringing
product undoubtedly skews a jury's damages determination.16 5 As the
district court observed, even with cross-examination and a limiting jury
instruction, "'[t]he $19 billion cat was never put back into the
bag . . .'"166
C. THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTs ACT
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law by
President Barack Obama on September 16, 2011,167 and it enacts argua-
bly the most sweeping patent law reform in nearly six decades. The AIA
makes several fundamental changes to the way patents are prosecuted,
granted, and challenged. A complete treatment of the AIA is beyond the
scope of this article. The discussion that follows includes only what we
find to be the most noteworthy changes made by the Act.
Perhaps the most heralded reform resulting from the AIA's enactment
is the change from a "first-to-invent" to a "first-to-file" priority system.168
This change takes effect on March 16, 2013,169 and will bring the United
159. Id. at 1318-21.
160. Id. at 1318 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
161. Id. at 1319.




166. Id. (quoting Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150, 185 (D.R.I.
2009), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
167. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see
Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the
Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Enter-
preneurs Create Jobs, WHITEHOUSE.GOv, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-sys
tem-stim.
168. Sec. 3, § 100, 125 Stat. at 285-87.
169. Sec. 3(e)(3), § 111, 125 Stat. at 288.
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States in line with every other country that has a patent system.170 The
first-to-file regime enacted by the AIA dispenses with questions of aban-
donment and does away with interference proceedings formerly found in
35 U.S.C. H§ 102(c) and 102(g), respectively. 171 Interferences are replaced
by a new procedure at the PTO known as a "derivation proceeding,"
which allows a patent applicant to take priority over an earlier-filed appli-
cation by showing that an inventor named in the earlier application "de-
rived" the claimed invention from an inventor named in the later-filed
application. 172 Although much has been made of the transition to a first-
to-file system, the change is unlikely to have an effect on the vast major-
ity of patent applications. 73
The AIA also expands the universe of available prior art. 7 4 Formerly,§ 102(b) prevented a patent from issuing if the claimed invention was in
public use or on sale in the United States for more than one year prior to
the patent's filing.' 75 The AIA establishes that a sale or public use occur-
ring anywhere in the world at any time before the patent is filed will
prevent that patent from issuing.176 This change should benefit accused
infringers, and it will cause potential patentees to be more careful about
conducting sales and demonstrations abroad.
The AIA provides two new ways to challenge the validity of an issued
patent.'77 The first is the inter partes review, which replaces the former
inter partes reexamination proceeding.17 8 A third party may file a petition
for inter partes review at the PTO to cancel one or more claims in a pat-
ent, but "only on a ground that could be raised under [§§] 102 or 103 and
only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publica-
tions."179 To successfully institute an inter partes review, the petitioner
must show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least
one of the challenged claims.' 80 This is somewhat stricter than the "sub-
stantial new question of patentability" standard associated with the for-
mer inter partes reexamination proceeding.18 Once instituted, the
170. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX,
A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 548 (1998) (noting that every nation but the United States utilizes a
first-to-file system of priority).
171. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(c), 102(g) (2006).
172. Sec. 3(i), § 135, 125 Stat. at 289-90; see also sec. 3(h), § 291, 125 Stat. at 288-89
(providing for a similar remedy via civil action).
173. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 170, at 549 (finding that only 0.1% of patent
applications result in interferences and that the later-filed application prevails in less than
one-third of those).
174. Sec. 3(b), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 286.
175. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
176. See sec. 3(b), § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 285-86. However, to the extent that a sale or
public use is considered a "disclosure" under the new law, such disclosures made by the
inventor one year or less before the patent is filed will not prevent the patent from issuing.
See id. § 102(b)(1).
177. Sec. 6(a), ch. 31, 125 Stat. at 299-305.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 311(b), 125 Stat. at 299.
180. Id. § 314(a), 125 Stat. at 300.
181. See sec. 6(c)(3)(A)(i)(I)(aa), § 312, 125 Stat. at 305.
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petitioner must prove invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. 182
An inter partes review offers a challenger speedy resolution.183 If the pro-
ceeding is instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board will issue a final
determination within one year (extendable by six months for good
cause).184
The other new proceeding available to a third-party challenger is the
post-grant review.' 85 Generally, post-grant review is available only for
patents filed on or after March 16, 2013.186 However, the AIA creates a
transitional program that provides for a modified post-grant review of
"covered business method patents" as early as September 16, 2012.187
Unlike in an inter partes review, a petitioner for post-grant review may
cancel one or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised
under § 282 (i.e., §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112).188 A petition for post-grant
review must be filed within nine months of the date the patent issues.18 9
A post-grant review will be instituted only if the petitioner shows that it is
"more likely than not" that at least one of the challenged claims is unpat-
entable.190 As in the inter partes review, a petitioner must prove invalidity
by a preponderance of the evidence, and once a post-grant review is insti-
tuted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board will issue a final determination
within one year, extendable by six months for good cause.191
One of the broader goals of the AIA is to establish a more "stream-
lined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary
... litigation costs."1 9 2 To further this goal, the PTO seeks to conduct the
inter partes review and post-grant review "proceedings in a timely, fair,
and efficient manner."193 Only time will tell whether the AIA and the
PTO's rules and regulations have their intended effect.
182. Id. § 316(e), 125 Stat. at 303.
183. Id. § 316(a)(11), 125 Stat. at 302.
184. Id.
185. Sec. 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305-11.
186. See sec. 6(f)(2)(A), § 321, 125 Stat. at 311.
187. Sec. 18(a), 125 Stat. at 329. The Act defines a "covered business method patent" as
"a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing
or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inven-
tions." Sec. 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331.
188. See id. § 321(b), 125 Stat. at 306. However, a patentee's failure to comply with the
best mode requirement of § 112 will not cancel or invalidate any claim of a patent. See sec.
15, § 282, 125 Stat. at 328.
189. Sec. 6(d), § 321(c), 125 Stat. at 306.
190. Id. § 324(a), 125 Stat. at 306.
191. Id. §§ 326(a)(11), (e), 125 Stat. at 309.
192. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial
Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48612-01, 48612 (Aug.
14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 42, 90).
193. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756-01, 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012)




A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON COPYRIGHT
1. The Free Ride is Up-Golan v. Holder
In 1994, "[t]he Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations pro-
duced the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)," both of
which the United States joined. 194 Any country that signs on to TRIPS
must implement the first twenty-one articles of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), the
primary agreement governing international copyright relations. 195 Article
18 of the Berne Convention provides that "a work must be protected
abroad unless its copyright term has expired in either the country where
protection is claimed or the country of origin."196
Since the Berne Convention took effect in 1886, many works by foreign
authors have fallen into the public domain in the United States for rea-
sons unrelated to expiration of their copyright term.197 Seeking to bring
the United States into compliance with TRIPS, "Congress. . .gave works
enjoying copyright protection abroad the same . . . term of protection"
they would have had in the United States had those works never passed
into the public domain.' 98 Congress accomplished this by enacting the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), § 514, "which grants copy-
right protection to preexisting works of Berne member countries" that
lacked protection in the United States for any of three reasons: (1) the
United States did not protect works from the country of origin at the time
of publication; (2) the United States did not protect sound recordings
fixed before 1972; or (3) the author had failed to comply with U.S. statu-
tory formalities.199 In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court considered
whether Congress could remove works from the public domain in the
manner provided by § 514.200
The petitioners in Golan challenged the constitutionality of § 514 as a
violation of both the Constitution's Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. 201 Essentially, petitioners argued that once a work falls into
the public domain, it may never be removed for any reason. 202 The Court
rejected these arguments and held that § 514 passed constitutional mus-
ter.2 0 3 The Court found that granting copyright protection to these previ-
ously unprotected works did not violate the "limited Time[ ]" restriction
in the Copyright Clause because the term granted to these works was just
194. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2012).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 878.
197. Id. at 878-79.
198. Id. at 877-79.
199. Id. at 875, 878; see 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2012).
200. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
201. Id. at 884.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 894.
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as limited as the term granted to domestic works.204 Although petitioners
argued that the limited term of "zero" had already passed for the unpro-
tected foreign works, the Court found little sense in this argument, rea-
soning that a "'limited time' of exclusivity must begin before it . . .
end[s]." 205 Petitioners also argued that § 514 fails to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts" as required by the Constitution because
it does nothing to incentivize the creation of new works.206 The Court
dismissed this argument by observing that "creation of at least one new
work .. . is not the sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learn-
ing." 207 Finding nothing in the text of the Copyright Clause that would
render the public domain as inviolable as petitioners urged, the Court
bolstered its conclusion by noting that Congress had, in the past, granted
protection to works that were previously in the public domain.208 Finally,
the Court rejected petitioners' First Amendment arguments by noting
that "fair use" and the "idea/expression dichotomy" built into copyright
law serve as adequate speech-protective safeguards. 209
2. Certiorari Granted-John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng
Under the first sale doctrine, the lawful owner of a copyrighted work
may resell or otherwise dispose of that work without the permission of
the copyright owner. 210 However, § 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act pro-
hibits importing copyrighted works without the permission of the copy-
right owner.211 In Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., the Supreme
Court considered whether the first sale doctrine applies to foreign-made
copies of copyrighted works that are sold abroad, imported, and then re-
sold in the United States.212 Justice Kagan took no part in that decision,
and an equally divided Court affirmed without opinion the Ninth Cir-
cuit's determination that the first sale doctrine does not apply to goods
manufactured and sold abroad.213 The Supreme Court now appears set to
decide this issue with its grant of certiorari from the Second Circuit case
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng.214
Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng's family and friends in Thailand shipped
him foreign-edition textbooks that were printed abroad by a John Wiley
& Sons subsidiary. 215 Kirtsaeng then sold these textbooks on websites
204. Id. at 884-85.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 887-88 (quoting U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
207. Id. at 888.
208. Id. at 885-87.
209. Id. at 890-91.
210. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
211. Id. § 602(a)(1).
212. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565, 565 (2010).
213. Id.
214. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2011), cert.




such as eBay.com. 2 16 With the revenues from the sales, Kirtsaeng reim-
bursed his family and friends for their expenses and kept the profits for
himself.217 John Wiley & Sons filed suit against Kirtsaeng for copyright
infringement, claiming that Kirtsaeng violated § 602(a)(1) by importing
the copyrighted foreign-edition textbooks. 218 Kirtsaeng tried to raise a
defense based on the first sale doctrine, but the district court found this
defense inapplicable to copies published outside of the United States.219
In determining whether the first sale doctrine applies to copies manu-
factured abroad, the Second Circuit first looked to the text of § 109(a). 220
Section 109(a) embodies the first sale doctrine, 221 and it applies to copies
"lawfully made under [Title 17]."222 After extensive analysis, the court
found this text too ambiguous to decide the issue alone. 2 2 3 Confronted
with an ambiguous statute, the court adopted an interpretation it found
would best comport with § 602(a)(1)." 2 2 4 The court reasoned that if the
first sale doctrine applied to copies manufactured and acquired abroad,
§ 602(a)(1) would lose much of its force because copyright holders would
no longer be able to control importation of their works in the vast major-
ity of cases. 225 The court therefore held that the first sale doctrine applies
only to copies manufactured domestically. 226
During oral argument at the Supreme Court, several of the Justices
expressed concerns regarding the implications of the Second Circuit's
holding.227 Justice Breyer observed that foreign-made cars have many
copyrighted components, and he wondered whether the millions of
Americans who buy these imports would be able to resell them without
first obtaining the permission of the copyright holder of every copy-
righted component in the car.2 2 8 Justice Sotomayor seemed to share re-
lated concerns.229 Further, as counsel for Kirtsaeng observed at oral
argument, the Second Circuit's rule might incentivize copyright owners to
move manufacturing of their works offshore in order to circumvent the
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 213-14.
219. Id. at 214.
220. Id. at 216.
221. Id.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
223. John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 220.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 221. This reasoning is similar to that used by the Ninth Circuit in its Omega
decision. The court there noted that "because importation is almost always preceded by at
least one lawful foreign sale," applying the first-sale doctrine to foreign sales would
"render § 602 virtually meaningless." Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d
982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
226. John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 221.
227. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Kirstaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1905 (2012) (No. 11-697).
228. Id. In practice, this situation may involve a copyright license or sale, so the lan-
guage of the agreement would be important to analyze.
229. Id. at 30-32.
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first sale doctrine and maintain full control over downstream sales. 230 To
avoid these possible results, the Court could adopt the middle ground
endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, which applies the first sale doctrine to
foreign-made goods once an authorized sale occurs in the United
States.231 However sensible this interpretation might be, it finds little sup-
port in the text of the statute.232 If the Court is unable to resolve this
issue with the statutory text alone, it may have to weigh the aforemen-
tioned potential consequences against the effects of curtailing copyright
owners' ability to control importation of their works. Given the statute's
ambiguity, legislative action ultimately may be necessary to resolve this
issue in a way that addresses these competing concerns. 233
B. THE CIRCUIT COURTS ON COPYRIGHT
1. Safe Harbor?-Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
During the Survey period, the Second Circuit released its long-awaited
decision in the case of Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.2 3 4
YouTube faced potential liability for direct and secondary copyright in-
fringement for displaying infringing works uploaded by its users.235 YOU-
Tube's liability turned on whether it qualified for protection under the
safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). 236 The district court granted summary judgment to Youtube,
finding that it satisfied the requirements for safe harbor under § 512(c)
with respect to all of the infringement claims.237 Section 512(c) offers a
service provider such as YouTube immunity from liability for the infring-
ing activity of its users as long as the service provider is not operating
with actual knowledge of infringement, or "in the absence of such ...
knowledge, . . . [with] aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent." 238 The district court interpreted this pro-
vision to mean that the service provider must know of "specific and iden-
tifiable infringements of particular individual items" and that "[m]ere
knowledge of [the] prevalence of such [infringing activity] . . . is not
enough. "239
The Second Circuit affirmed this interpretation of the § 512(c) safe har-
230. See id. at 20.
231. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008),
abrogated by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
232. Id.
233. In March 2013, the Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to goods manu-
factured abroad as well as domestically-manufactured goods. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355-56 (2013).
234. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id. at 30; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (m)-(n) (2006).
237. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29 (citing Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d
514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
238. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
239. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 29.
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bor provision,240 but it nevertheless vacated the district court's grant of
summary judgment because it determined that a reasonable jury could
find that Youtube knew of specific occurrences of infringement. 241 The
record before the court showed reports and emails authored by You-
Tube's founders that indicated their awareness of specific videos that they
knew or suspected were infringing.242 The court also held that the doc-
trine of willful blindness could apply to show actual knowledge, and it
remanded the case to the district court for further fact-finding on whether
the defendants made a "deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge." 243
Aside from these knowledge provisions, "the § 512(c) safe harbor pro-
vides that an eligible service provider must 'not receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the ser-
vice provider has the right and ability to control such activity." 244 The
court found that the right and ability to control infringing activity does
not require specific knowledge of particular infringing activities; however,
it does "'requir[e] something more than the ability to remove or block
access to materials posted on . . . [the] website." 245 The court failed to
articulate a specific test to determine what this "something more" might
be, but it provided some guidance by alluding to other decisions which
"involve[d] a service provider exerting substantial influence on the activi-
ties of users . ."246 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district
court to consider in the first instance whether a reasonable jury could find
that YouTube had the right and ability to control the infringing
activity.247
Although hailed by some as a win for the user-generated content com-
munity at large,248 the Second Circuit's opinion provides plaintiffs with
more ways to negate a DMCA safe harbor defense. 249 Specifically, the
court's application of the willful blindness doctrine and its interpretation
of the "right and ability to control" provision of § 512(c) mean that fur-
ther litigation in this area is sure to follow.
240. Id. at 30, 41.
241. Id. at 41.
242. Id. at 33-34.
243. Id. at 35 (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see discussion supra Part II.A.3. However, the court
made clear that application of the willful blindness doctrine does not give rise to an affirm-
ative duty to monitor the service for infringing activity. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (citing 17
U.S.C. § 512(m) (2006)).
244. Id. at 36 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B)).
245. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36-38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821
F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
246. Id. at 38, 42.
247. Id. at 42.
248. See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Viacom v. Google: A Decision at Last, and It's Mostly
Good (for the Internet and Innovation), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/viacom-v-google-decision.




A. ATTACK AND RETREAT-ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court considered
"whether a covenant not to enforce a trademark against a competitor's
existing products and any future 'colorable imitations' [thereof] moots
the competitor's action to have the trademark declared invalid." 250 Nike
brought a complaint against Already alleging trademark infringement.251
Already counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the asserted
mark was invalid.252 A few months later, Nike determined that the in-
fringement case was no longer worth pursuing, and it delivered a "Cove-
nant Not to Sue" to Already.253 This covenant prevented Nike from
asserting its mark against Already for any of Already's past and current
products, as well as any future imitations thereof.2 54 Nike then moved to
dismiss its infringement claims, but Already sought to maintain its coun-
terclaim challenging the trademark's validity.2 5 5 The district court dis-
missed Already's counterclaim, finding that Nike's covenant not to sue
meant there was no longer a "substantial controversy" that would sup-
port the issuance of a declaratory judgment. 256 The Second Circuit
affirmed. 257
"Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch authority to
adjudicate 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' 2 5 8 A case loses this Article III
requirement "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." 259 The Court observed,
however, "that a defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by
ending its unlawful conduct once [it is] sued. Otherwise, a defendant
could [just] ... have [a] case declared moot, then pick up where he left off
. ".. . 260 Therefore, "a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance
moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely
clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
to recur." 261 Under the Court's precedents, Nike bore the burden of
showing "that it 'could not reasonably be expected' to resume its enforce-
250. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2013). The Federal Circuit has
decided a similar issue in the context of a patent invalidity counterclaim, finding that a
covenant not to sue based on the accused infringer's "past and present products" divests a
court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the accused's invalidity counterclaim. See Super
Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1995).





256. Id. at 726.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
260. Id. at 727 (citation omitted).
261. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 190 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
998 [Vol. 66
Intellectual Property Law
ment efforts against Already." 262
The Court held that Nike satisfied this burden.263 Nike's covenant not
to sue was unconditional, irrevocable, and covered not only "current or
previous designs, but [also] any [future] colorable imitations" thereof.2 6 4
Given Nike's showing that the covenant contemplated all of its allegedly
unlawful enforcement efforts, maintaining jurisdiction over the invalidity
counterclaim required Already to show that it had "sufficiently concrete
plans to engage in activities not covered by the covenant." 265 The Court
found that, despite several opportunities to do so, Already had failed to
demonstrate "any intent to design or market a [product] that would ex-
pose it to [potential] . . . infringement liability.266 The Court therefore
affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling and held that the case was moot.2 6 7
The strategy employed by Nike in this case seems to be an effective
way of disrupting a smaller competitor's business operations while still
protecting the asserted trademark's validity. Justice Kennedy, recognizing
the potential for abuse, wrote a concurring opinion that advised courts to
"proceed with caution before ruling that [a covenant not to sue] can be
used to terminate litigation." 2 6 8
B. COLOR IS THE "SOLE" ISSUE-CHRISTIAN LouBouTIN S.A. v.
YVEs SAINT LAURENT AMERICA HOLDING, INC.
The Supreme Court has held that, in some circumstances, a color may
be trademarked.269 In Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent
America Holding, Inc., the Second Circuit considered whether a color
may receive trademark protection in the fashion industry.270 Christian
Louboutin designs and markets women's high-heeled shoes that have
their undersides (or "outsoles") painted glossy red.2 7 1 On most of
Louboutin's shoes, the red outsole contrasts sharply with the color of the
rest of the shoe. 27 2 The PTO granted Louboutin a trademark consisting of
a "lacquered red sole on footwear."273 Yves Saint Laurent, a competitor
in the fashion industry, began selling a "monochrome" shoe which was
entirely red.2 7 4 Louboutin brought claims against Yves Saint Laurent al-
262. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190); contra Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v.
Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (placing the burden of support-
ing jurisdiction on the party asserting a patent invalidity counterclaim).
263. Already, 133 S. Ct. at 728.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 729.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
269. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995).
270. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
211 (2d Cir. 2012).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 213.
273. Id. (quoting Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Inc., 778 F.




leging trademark infringement, and it sought a preliminary injunction
that would prevent Yves Saint Laurent from marketing its allegedly in-
fringing shoes. 275 The district court denied the request for an injunction
and held that Louboutin's trademark was likely invalid because single-
color marks in the fashion industry are "inherently 'functional.'" 2 7 6
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's .per se rule regarding
single-color trademarks in the fashion industry, finding such a rule incon-
sistent with Supreme Court precedent. 277 The court evaluated the in-
fringement claim by analyzing whether the mark "merits protection" and
whether use of the mark "is likely to cause consumer confusion." 278 A
mark merits protection if it is "distinctive." 2 7 9 Distinctiveness may be
proved by showing that the mark has acquired "secondary meaning in the
public eye" that causes the mark to be associated with the creator's
brand.280 The court found that Louboutin's mark had acquired secondary
meaning, but only where the red sole contrasts with the color of the rest
of the shoe.281 The court modified the mark pursuant to § 37 of the Lan-
ham Act and limited it to only those situations in which the red outsole
contrasts with the color of the rest of the shoe.2 8 2 The court then affirmed
the district court's denial of the request for a preliminary injunction, find-
ing that the defendant's monochromatic shoe did not "use" the mark as
modified.283 Although the court extensively analyzed the functionality
defense as applied to color marks in the fashion industry, its modification
of the mark made it unnecessary to rule on the defense's applicability in
this case. 284
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the Supreme Court's decisions and anticipated decisions will
have profound effects on industry. The Court's decision in Mayo and its
grant of certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology have injected
uncertainty into the biotechnology industry, which has been relying on
settled practices in the PTO for many years. If the Court reverses the
Federal Circuit in Bowman, the agricultural industry will have a difficult
time enforcing its seed patents. In Kirtsaeng, the Court's decision could
either prevent the content industry from controlling importation of its
275. Id.
276. Id. at 214 (quoting Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 457). The Fifth Circuit currently
rejects the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" entirely. See Bd. of Supervisors for La.
State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487-88 (5th Cir.
2008).
277. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 223 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 161 (1995)).
278. Id. at 224 (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d
108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Id. at 225.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 228.
282. Id.; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012).
283. Louboutin. 696 F.3d at 228.
284. Id. at 223-24, 228.
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works or cause the industry to manufacture more of its works overseas. In
Already, the Court's decision will affect the way companies enforce and
protect their trademarks. The Federal Circuit's decision in Akamai solves
some problems of joint infringement but creates many more, while its
decision in Uniloc continues the court's trend of demanding reliable evi-
dence to support a damages award. The Second Circuit's decision in
Viacom gives service providers considerable protection under the
DMCA, but it leaves room for future plaintiffs to prevail. Finally, the sea
change brought about by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act will af-
fect courts and practitioners for many years to come.
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